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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Criminal Law-Search Warrants-Requirements of Search Warrants
for Liquor Possessed for the Purpose of Sale
Although the recent case of State v,. Banks' had a modern fact situation, 2 it brought to the attention of the North Carolina Supreme Court
the old and troublesome problem of the requirements of search warrants
obtained for liquor possessed for the purpose of sale.3
Search warrants may be issued in North Carolina only as authorized
by statute.4 The statute authorizing search warrants for liquor possessed for the purpose of sale and for liquor-maldng materials is G.S.
§ 18-13. The pertinent provisions are:
Upon the filing of a complaint under oath by a reputable citizen,
or information furnished under oath by an officer charged with
the execution of the law, before . . . [any] officer authorized by
the law to issue warrants, that he has reason to believe that any
person has in his possession, at a place or places specified, liquor
for the purpose of sale, or equipment or materials designed ...
for use in the manufacture of... liquor, a warrant shall be issued
commanding the officer ...to search the place or places described
in such complaint or information ....
There is no other statute specifically dealing with the requirements
of search warrants for liquor, but G.S. § 15-27 places certain restrictions
on the issuance of all search warrants. It provides that:
Any officer who shall sign and issue ... a search warrant without first requiring the complainant or other person to sign an
affidavit under oath and examining said person . . . in regard
thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered
by reason of the issuance of such illegal search warrant shall be
competent as evidence in the trial of any action: Provided, no
facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring
. . a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial
of any action.
*

Before the 1957 General Assembly enacted G.S. § 15-27.1, the North
Carolina decisions were in conflict as to whether or not a liquor warrant
issued under G.S. § 18-13 had to meet the requirements of G.S. § 15-27.
G.S. § 15-27.1 was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that:
1250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
'The search warrant was obtained with information transmitted by highway
patrol radio.
' The scope of this note will be limited to the procedure to be followed in issuing
a search warrant, and will not discuss the requirement of a description of the place
to be searched and of the items to be searched for. These latter requirements are
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-26 (1953). As to the detail needed to comply
with the statute, see MACHEN, SEARcH AND SzrzuRE 21-28 (1950).
'State v. Mann, 27 N.C. 45 (1844) ; State v. McDonald, 14 N.C. 468 (1832).
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"The provision of this article5 shall apply to search warrants issued
for any purpose including those issued pursuant to the provisions of G.S.
18-13 ...."
The fact that North Carolina needed such legislation becomes apparent when one examines the case law dealing with the procedure for
issuing search warrants for liquor prior to the enactment of this statute.
It appears that the court initially presumed that search warrants for
liquor had to comply with the dual requirements of G.S. § 18-13 and
G.S. § 15-27.6 However, in 1952 in State v. McLamb 7 the court held
that only the provisions of G.S. § 18-13 were applicable to search warrants for liquor. In that case the court held not relevant the defendant's
contention that the search warrant was defective for the reason that the
magistrate who issued it had not complied with the requisites of G.S.
§ 15-27 in that he had failed to require the procuring officer to furnish
facts showing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. Thus
apparently under that decision, if the search warrant for liquor was
sought by "an officer charged with the execution of the law," the normal
G.S. § 15-27 requirement of furnishing facts upon which the officer
based his belief to the examining magistrate was relaxed. State v.
Brady,8 a later case, reiterated this rule. Thus there arose a distinction
between the basic requirements for the issuance of search warrants for
liquor and the issuance of search warrants for other types of contraband.
The constitutionality of G.S. § 18-13 has never been challenged.
However, since under the McLamb and Brady decisions its provisions
do not require that an officer seeking a search warrant for liquor furnish facts showing probable cause for its issuance, this statute would
appear to be vulnerable to such an attack. The North Carolina Constitution requires that all warrants "be supported by evidence," 9 and the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that a state shall issue no warrant without probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation. 10 G.S. § 18-13 as interpreted by McLamb and
Brady would not seem to meet the foregoing requirements.
'Article 4, chapter 15, entitled Search Warrants, of which G.S. § 15-27 is a
component part.
' Several pre-1952 decisions deal with the issuance of search warrants for
liquor possessed for the purpose of sale, and discuss compliance with G.S. § 15-27.
E.g., State v. Gross, 230 N.C. 734, 55 S.E.2d 517 (1949) ; State v. Elder, 217 N.C.
111, 6 S.E.2d 840 (1940) ; State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195 S.E. 392 (1938).
7235 N.C. 251, 69 S.E.2d 537 (1952).
8 238 N.C. 404, 78 S.E.2d 126 (1953).
'N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 15.
"o"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the policewhich is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949).
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Although the court emphatically stated in the McLamb and Brady
decisions that G.S. § 18-13 was controlling as to the procedural requisites
in cases of liquor warrants, in reality the court maintained this position
for only a short time. Soon after the McLamb decision the court
rendered several decisions that indicated that both G.S. § 18-13 and G.S.
§ 15-27 applied with equal force to the issuance of liquor warrants. In
State v. Rainey" the court, ruling on the validity of a liquor warrant,
stated, "The [issuing] procedure followed fulfills the requirements of the
controlling statutes. G.S. 18-13 and G.S. 15-27 as amended."' 2 In
State v. Harrison13 the court relied on G.S. § 15-27 to exclude evidence
obtained under an invalid search warrant for liquor issued under G.S.
§ 18-13. In State v. McMilliam'4 the court again relied on the provisions of G.S. § 15-27 to exclude evidence obtained where officers made
a search for liquor without a warrant under circumstances that required
a valid search warrant.
In 1956 the court in State v. White 5 held that a search warrant for
liquor was defective because the issuing officer had not required the
constable to sign an affidavit under oath to support the issuance of the
warrant as required by G.S. § 15-27. Thus this case was in direct conflict with the court's previous holding in the McLamb and Brady decisions. 6
The 1957 General Assembly took cognizance of the conflict among
the cases in this area and enacted the aforementioned G.S. § 15-27.1.
The obvious intent of the General Assembly was to insure that before
any magistrate issued a search warrant for liquor he would examine
the complainant, take a sworn affidavit, and make a judicial determination of probable cause upon evidence furnished by the complainant. The
General Assembly thereby overruled the McLamb and Brady decisions
on this precise point.
In the principal case, State v. Banks,17 a highway patrolman saw
the defendant make eight or nine trips into an Alcoholic Beverage Control store and on each trip return to an automobile with a large paper
bag. The patrolman stopped the defendant, asked for permission to
search the automobile, and, when this request was refused, radioed headquarters and informed a second patrolman. Acting on this information,
the second patrolman went before an issuing officer and obtained a search
warrant. The automobile, stopped a second time by the patrolman, was
12236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E2d 39 (1953).

Id. at 740, 74 S.E.2d at 40.
239 N.C. 659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954).
1"243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E.2d 202 (1956).
15244 N.C. 73, 92 S.E.2d 404 (1956).
" For an analysis of the conflict between the McLamb and White 'decisions see
NoTF, 35 N.C.L. R-v. 424 (1957).
17250 N.C. 728. 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
'

',
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searched pursuant to the warrant, and a large quantity of tax-paid liquor
was found.
The defendant was convicted for the illegal possession of the liquor
that had been seized in his automobile, and on appeal the validity of the
search warrant was challenged. In a per curiam opinion the North
Carolina Supreme Court said that "the information furnished by Patrolman McDonald over the radio to Patrolman Moran, who signed the
affidavit based on such information, pursuant to which the search -warriht was issued, was sufficient infornwtion within the meaning of G.S.
18-13 to authorize Patrolman Moran to make the affidavit and to
authorize the Clerk of the General County Court... to issue such warrant. State v. McLamb ...."218
The court's acquiescence in the use of the information transmitted
over the patrol radio is in essence the approval of the use of hearsay
evidence in obtaining a search warrant. This rule of evidence is established in North Carolina as in many jurisdictions,"0 and within the
bbunds of proper discretion2" it would seem to be a sound and practical
one. In light of North Carolina's adoption of the use of hearsay evidence
to show probable cause, the magistrate was justified in issuing the search
warrant in the Banks case.
Even if under the circumstances of the case the requirements of
G.S. § 15-27 were not met,21 the defendant failed to overcome the pre18

Id. at 730, 110 S.E.2d at 323.
Some courts have held affidavits sufficient where the affiant's belief is based
oh information received from "reliable persons," "responsible persons," "reputable
persons," "citizens," and "credible people." Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950).
The federal rule is contra. "A search warrant may issue only upon evidence
which would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury ... and would
lead a man of prudence and caution to believe that the offense has been committed." Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932).
The North Carolina decisions seem to approve the hearsay rule, and there is no
indication of an adoption of the federal rule. State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195
S.E. 392 (1938). "There is nothing in the statute [G.S. § 15-27] that requires the
complainant or other person who makes the affidavit to state therein who his
informant is, or which requires the informant to make the affidavit, as seems to
be the contention of the appellant?' Id. at 218, 195 S.E. at 392; accord, State
v. Elder. 217 N.C. 111, 6 S.E.2d 840 :(1940). These cases hold only that the informer's name need not be given in the affidavit. Whether the magistrate would
be justified in issuing the warrant without learning the source on the examination
is an open question.
20A magistrate cannot be allowed to find a probability of guilt without examiing the complaining witness in regards to his affidavit. G.S. § 15-27. This
exaiination is to test the reliability' 6f the evidence, and if the magistrate fails
to make such an examination recourse may be had against him. G.S. § 15-27.
Reliable evidence has been held to include hearsay informatiori originating with
reputable informers. State v. Cradle, 213 N.C. 217, 195 S.E. 392 (1938); Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 605 (1950). It would not apptar that anonymous phone calls or tips
"

should be accepted as reliable hearsay.
21 From

MACHEN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE fl '(1950).

the statement of facts given in the Banks' case it appears that Patrolman Moran 'told the issuing 0fficei9 ju.t' what Patrolman McDonald had seen
and that Patrolman Moran did sign the afidavit, so the requirements of"G.S. §
15-27 would seem to have been complied with.
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sumption of statutory compliance that arises when the warrant and
supporting affidavit are set out in the record.22 The decision is therefore proper. However, the court in citing the McLamb decision and
speaking of meeting the requirements of only G.S. § 18-13 could leave
the erroneous impression that there is still a distinction between the requirements for obtaining a search warrant for illegally possessed liquor
and a search warrant for other statutory contraband. As we have
noted, since the enactment of G.S. § 15-27.1, there is no longer any such
distinction in the requirements for issuance of search warrants. It is
unfortunate that the court did not seize upon this opportunity to take
judicial notice of G.S. § 15-27.1, and it is hoped that on the court's
next opportunity it will recognize this legislative move toward greater
uniformity and thereby clear the muddy waters in this area.
JoiaN H. KERR, III
Criminal Procedure-Capital Offenses-Prosecution's Mention of
Death Penalty Before Jury as Error
Prior to 1949 a conviction of murder in the first degree in North
Carolina carried an automatic death penalty under the former version
of G.S. § 14-17.1 That year the General Assembly added a proviso
to the statute which stated that "if at the time of rendering its verdict in
be imopen court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall
' 2
jury.
the
instruct
so
shall
court
the
and
...
life
prisonment for
State v. Mclfillan3 was apparently the first case interpreting this
proviso. The trial judge had instructed the jury that they might recommend life imprisonment if they felt justified in doing so under the facts
and circumstances of the case. A new trial was granted because the
2 State v. Rhodes, 233 N.C. 453, 64 S.E.2d 287 (1951) ; State v. Elder, 217 N.C.
111, 6 S.E.2d 840 (1940); cf. State v. McMilliam, 243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E.2d 202
(1956), where the State failed to produce a search warrant or render testimony

supporting its existence. The court ruled that the evidence obtained by the search
would not be introduced. "It might have been a general warrant, which is
'dangerous to liberty'." Id. at 773, 92 S.E.2d at 204.
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or ,Which' shall. be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree and- shall be punished with death. All other kinds
"N.C. Sess. Laws
of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree ....

1893, chs. 85, 281.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). For the origin of the proviso see Report of
the Committee for Improvement of Justice, Popular Government, Jan. 1949, p. 13,
col. 3; Criminal Law, Survey of Statutory Changes, 27 N.C.L. Rxv. 449 (1950).

Provisos of like effect were'also added to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953) (rape),
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1953) (burglary) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953)
(arson).
2233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E.2d 212 (1951).

